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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
action, and the Board acts "in good faith," the question of
whether the penalty imposed is excessive is not one for judicial
review.17 In both cases the court followed what appears to be
the policy of constitutional and statutory provisions guarantee-
ing to civil service employees on whom disciplinary action has
been taken a fair hearing, but leaving the merits of the contro-
versy to the Civil Service Board. The wisdom of this policy ap-
pears indisputable; any other would plunge the courts in every
case into detailed consideration of the adequacy or inadequacy
of the evidence and the appropriateness or excessiveness of the
penalty imposed.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Melvin G. Dakin*
In Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Lou-
isiana Public Service Commission' the court upheld a rate order
which represented for this Commission a first full application 2
of the principles of rate making expounded by Justice Brandeis
in his concurring opinion in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company3 and subsequently approved in application
by the United States Supreme Court in Federal Power Commis-
sion v. Hope Natural Gas Company.4 Excerpts from the Missouri
concurring opinion state these principles succinctly:
"I differ fundamentally from my brethren concerning the
rule to be applied in determining whether a prescribed rate
is confiscatory .... The so-called rule of Smyth vs. Ames is,
in my opinion, legally and economically unsound. The thing
devoted by the investor to the public use is not specific prop-
erty, tangible and intangible, but capital embarked in the
enterprise.... The investor agrees, by embarking capital in a
26 (La. 1957). The Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Law was created by
LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15.1.
17. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 31: "This hearing shall be confined to the determi-
nation of whether the decision made by the board was in good faith for cause
under the provisions of this Section."
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 232 La. 446, 94 So.2d 431 (1957).
2. For an earlier abortive attempt to apply these principles, see Gulf States
Utilities Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 222 La. 132, 62 So.2d 250
(1952) commented on in 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 104 (1953).
3. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission of Missouri, 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
4. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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utility, that its charges to the public shall be reasonable. His
company is the substitute for the state in the performance
of the public service; thus becoming a public servant. The
compensation which the Constitution guarantees an oppor-
tunity to earn is the reasonable cost of conducting the busi-
ness. Cost includes not only operating expenses, but also
capital charges. Capital charges cover the allowance, by way
of interest, for the use of the capital, whatever the nature of
the security issues therefor; the allowance for risk incurred;
and enough more to attract capital. The reasonable rate to be
prescribed by a Commission may allow an efficiently man-
aged utility much more. But a rate is constitutionally com-
pensatory, if it allows to the utility the opportunity to earn
the cost of the service as thus defined. 5
"The adoption of the amount prudently invested as the
rate base and the amount of the capital charge as the measure
of the rate of return would give definiteness to these two
factors involved in rate controversies which are now shifting
and treacherous, and which render the proceedings peculiarly
burdensome and largely futile. Such measures offer a basis
for decision which is certain and stable. The rate base would
be ascertained as a fact, not determined as a matter of opin-
ion. It would not fluctuate with the market price of labor,
or materials, or money ... it would, when once made in re-
spect to any utility, be fixed, for all time, subject only to
increase to represent additions to plant, after allowances for
the depreciation included in the annual operating charges.0
"It was . . . not feasible that [at the time of Smyth vs.
Ames], to adopt, as the rate base, the amount properly in-
vested, or as the rate of fair return, the amount of the capital
charge. Now the situation is fundamentally different. These
amounts are now readily ascertainable in respect to a large,
and rapidly increasing, proportion of the utilities. The
change in this respect is due to the enlargement, meanwhile,
of the powers and functions of state Utility Commissions.
The issue of securities is now, and for many years has been,
under the control of Commissions, in the leading states.
Hence the amount of capital raised (since the conferring
5. 262 U.S. at 290, 291.
6. Id. at 306, 307.
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of these powers) and its cost are definitely known, through
current supervision and prescribed accounts supplemented by
inspection of the Commission's engineering force. Like
knowledge concerning the investment of that part of the
capital raised and expended before these broad functions
were exercised by the Utility Commissions has been secured,
in many cases, through investigations undertaken later, in
connection with the issue of new securities or the regulation
of rates. The amount and disposition of current earnings of
all the companies are also known. It is therefore, feasible
now to adopt as the measure of a compensatory rate the an-
nual cost, or charge, of the capital prudently invested in the
utility. And, hence, it should be done."'7
The court did not, in its decision, adopt any theory of rate-
making as its own; rather it simply upheld the Commission's
order on the ground "that there are no exceptional circumstances
in this case authorizing a finding that the action of the... Com-
mission is arbitrary, capricious, and confiscatory. '8 The holding
is significant, however, in light of the vigor with which it was
argued that the rate of return must be on a property rate base
and that Justice Brandeis actually contemplated such a prop-
erty base, although at original cost rather than fair market
value. The Commission used property figures, not as a rate base,
but as a basis for allocating the appropriate portion of the total
company capitalization to Louisiana intrastate operations.9
The court has thus upheld the Commission in the results of a
rate-making method which proceeded on the principle that the
cost of servicing the apportioned capital obligations of the utility
(brought into adjustment as to percentage of debt and tax bur-
dens with comparable independent utilities) was a proper re-
turn.10 The Commission allowed, as such cost of capital, contract
and estimated interest on debt securities adjusted to 45 percent
of capital structure and 6.6 percent on the adjusted common
stock capital, a rate of earnings found to be commensurate with
investor expectations in comparable utility investments."
7. Id. at 309, 310.
8. 232 La. 446, 463, 94 So.2d 431, 438 (1957).
9. Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Southern Bell Telephone & Tele-
graph Company, 14 P.U.R.3d 146, 155, 174 (1956).
10. Id. at 174.
11. Ibid.
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